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OVERHAUL OF THE SDT
PROVISIONS IN THE
WTO: SEPARATING THE
ELIGIBLE FROM THE
INELIGIBLE
Md. Rizwanul Islam

ABSTRACT
The special and differential treatment (“SDT”) provisions
have been a recurring feature in the agreements of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) treaties. However, most analysts
would probably agree that the many SDT provisions have been
more aspirational than operational. Hence, there is little
surprise that even a selective review of the WTO jurisprudence
would demonstrate that the SDT provisions have, in most cases,
not done enough for their intended beneficiaries. This paper will
analyze the limitations of the SDT provisions with reference to
the relevant WTO jurisprudence. It will seek to explore two
potential avenues of endeavoring to make the SDT provisions
engender more tangible outcomes for their intended
beneficiaries. This article argues that although the two means
discussed here may not seem connected, they indeed are.
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INTRODUCTION

Special and differential treatment (“SDT”) provisions in one
form or another have been an integral part of most of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) treaties. According to the estimate
of the WTO Secretariat, currently, there are as many as 155 SDT
provisions in various WTO treaties.1 Perceived as a way of
helping the economically less developed states to integrate into
the global trade, the SDT seems to have hardly met its core
objective. The share of the least developed countries (“LDCs”) in
the global trade has not increased up to the expected level,2 and
the same could possibly be said for most of the small developing
members of the WTO. This paper argues that two key
constraints with the SDT regime have limited its success. One
is the aspirational nature of most of the SDT provisions in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) as well as in
the WTO regime. The second is the self-declaring nature of
developing country status in the WTO regime. And this second
issue is intrinsically linked with, and has impacted, the first.
When Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) members such as Israel, Singapore, or
South Korea can declare themselves as developing members, a
regime developed to benefit less developed economies gets too
stretched.3 This article will explore two ways to improve the
state of play to help SDT provisions benefit their intended
beneficiaries. And it argues that making the SDT provisions
more precise and more directly justiciable and the overhaul of
the self-declaratory developing country members, are
intrinsically connected with each other. This article does not
purport to cover the entire spectrum of challenges with the SDT
provisions within the WTO, but rather it wants to contribute to
1 Committee on Trade and Development, Note by the Secretariat, Special
and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, ¶
1.2, WT/COMTD/W/258 (March 2, 2021).
2 U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., The Least Developed Countries Report
2020, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2020, at 18 (2020).
3 OECD, Economy: Developing countries set to account for nearly 60% of
world
GDP
by
2030,
according
to
new
estimates,
https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/perspectives-global-development-shiftingwealth-press-release.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
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the ongoing discourse. Some commentators may argue that SDT
provisions are actually self-defeating, in that they would often
entail less market-oriented measures for their beneficiaries, and
that it is in the interest of all WTO members to abide by all core
provisions of the WTO. 4 However, from that point of view, the
entire WTO negotiation process would appear to be ironic as
members would not have any WTO legal obligation to open their
market to foreign competitions. Any observer of the WTO would
know that WTO members simply do not follow that trajectory.
Thus, an overhaul of the present state of the SDT provisions is
an important matter for the WTO regime.
II. ASPIRATIONAL NATURE OF THE SDT PROVISIONS
Some analysts argue that the SDT provisions cannot and
should not be legally binding, as they have not been since their
inception.5 However, it does not seem that textually, there is
anything either in the GATT or the Marrakesh Agreements that
would lend credence to this view. 6 Indeed, SDT provisions are
just like other GATT/WTO provisions - an integral part of its
legal architecture. In essence, SDT provisions are squarely at
odds with a core principle of international law: the sovereign
equality of states.7 They also contradict a cardinal principle of
the GATT/WTO: the most favored nation treatment.8 With this
in mind, they have nonetheless been accepted on the basis of the
reality that not all members are capable of performing the same
4 Bernard Hoekman et al., Special and Differential Treatment of
Developing Countries in the WTO: Moving Forward After Cancún, 27 WORLD
ECON. 481, 482 (2003); cf. Paul A. Samuelson, Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut
and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization,
18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 135, 135 (2004) (explaining the benefit of following
the existing WTO rules).
5 J. Michael Finger, Developing Countries in the WTO System: Applying
Robert Hudec’s Analysis to the Doha Round, 31 WORLD ECON. 887, 891–92
(2008).
6 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, ¶ 28, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter
Doha Declaration].
7 See Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis
for International Organization, 53 YALE L. J. 207, 207 (1944) (explaining the
importance of the principle of the sovereign equality of states).
8 Craig VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade
Organization
237–38,
538
(2013),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_e.pdf.
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economic or legal obligations as the GATT/WTO regime
requires.9 Hans Kelsen has stated that “equality does not mean
equality of duties and rights, but rather equality of capacity for
duties and rights. Equality is the principle that under the same
conditions States have the same duties and the same rights.”10
Thus, economically disparate WTO members should not be
expected to be covered by an identical set of rules. 11 The role of
SDT in the WTO acquis also appears to be cemented in the words
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration which state that “[w]e
reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment
are an integral part of the WTO Agreements.”12 However, if the
SDT provisions are dissected properly, the aspirational nature
and hollowness of most of them in practice become evident. This
is even so, when the wording in the text of the treaty would, on
its face, suggest a mandatory obligation.
To take but one example, Article 12 of the Technical
Barriers to Trade Agreement (“TBT”) provides that “[m]embers
shall give particular attention to the provisions of this
Agreement concerning developing country Members’ rights and
obligations and shall take into account the special development,
financial and trade needs of developing country Members in the
implementation of this Agreement.”13 While the use of “shall”
would imply that this is a binding obligation imposed on all
members of the WTO, the meaninglessness of the provision is
evident from its interpretation by the Panel in US-COOL.14 In
this case, Mexico argued that the U.S. acted inconsistently with
Article 12.3 of the TBT by not affording Mexico an opportunity
to comment on the preparation of the Country of Origin
Labelling (COOL) measure.15 The Panel demurred and
observed:

9 Doha Declaration, supra note 6, ¶ 44 (explaining the use of the
provisions for LDCs).
10 Kelsen, supra note 7, at 209.
11 See id. at 208–09.
12 Doha Declaration, supra note 6, ¶ 44.
13 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 12.2, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex
1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
14 Panel Report, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements, ¶ 7.756-7.757, 7.789-7.792, WTO Docs. WT/DS384/R,
WT/DS386/R (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter U.S. COOL Requirements].
15 Id. ¶ 7.789.
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Article 12.3 does not specifically require WTO Members to
actively reach out to developing countries and collect their views
on their special needs. Further, we do not interpret the term “take
account of” in Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement as an explicit
requirement for Members to document specifically in their
legislative process and rule-making process how they actively
considered the special development, financial and trade needs of
developing country Members.16

The Panel went on to elaborate that:
As explained above, however, we do not consider that the
United States had an explicit obligation, enforceable in WTO
dispute settlement, to reach out and collect Mexico’s views during
the preparation and application of the COOL measure. The
United States is merely required under Article 12.3 to “take
account of [Mexico’s] special development, financial and trade
needs” “in the preparation and application of [the COOL
measure]”.
This means giving active and meaningful
consideration to such needs.17

Considering the text of Article 12.3, it is very difficult to
accuse the Panel of not giving any real substance to the SDT
provision here. Indeed, it is the imprecise nature of the text of
Article 12.3 that the Panel had to interpret, and it has done so
by staying faithful to the text. For the Panel to go beyond this,
the Panel could be seen as trying to add to or diminish what the
TBT provides for, which it is explicitly prohibited from doing
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”).18 But at
the same time, it shows the limited practical value many SDT
provisions have. Here, in practice, all that the U.S. needed to do
to fulfill its “legal obligation” under Article 12.3 was to claim
U.S. COOL Requirements, supra note 14, ¶ 7.787.
Id. ¶ 7.790.
18 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, art. 3.2, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 402 (stating “[t]he
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of
Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions
of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements”);
see also id. art. 19.2 (stating that “[i]n accordance with paragraph 2 of Article
3, in their findings and recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements”).
16
17
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that it had taken into account the “special development,
financial and trade needs” of Mexico when it developed its COOL
regime.19 To comply with this, the U.S. needed to afford Mexico
an opportunity to make deliberations, which was easily
achieved.20 Thus, the mere duty to “consider” seems to make a
mockery of SDT provisions as rights for its intended
beneficiaries.21 And it is difficult to see if any WTO member can
be found to have violated this so-called “legal obligation” that
requires WTO members to simply “take into account” the special
needs of developing countries.
In a similar vein, in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products,22 Argentina argued that by adopting and applying a
de facto moratorium on approvals of applications for market,
genetically modified organisms in its territories, the European
Communities (“EC”) did not apply its law in a manner that took
into account the needs of developing members as required by
Article 10.1 of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures.23 The Panel observed that the words
“take account of” do not necessitate that a specific result be
achieved.24 Or that just because the EC did not afford SDT to a
developing country member, there is no prima facie case that the
EC refrained from taking into account the developing country’s
needs when it adopted its law. 25 The Panel reiterated that “the
obligation laid down in Article 10.1 is for the importing Member
to “take account” of developing country Members’ needs.”26
Relying on the dictionary meaning, the Panel decided that

U.S. COOL Requirements, supra note 14, ¶¶ 7.738, 7.740.
Id. ¶ 7.740.
21 See id. ¶ 7.779 (explaining how the meaning of terms and their
implementation differ).
22 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶ 4.18, WTO Docs. WT/DS291/R,
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC Biotech Products].
23 Id. ¶ 7.1605–7.1607; see The WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (last visited Nov. 12,
2021) (stating “[i]n the preparation and application of sanitary or
phytosanitary measures, Members shall take account of the special needs of
developing country Members, and in particular of the least-developed country
Members”).
24 EC Biotech Products, supra note 22, ¶ 7.1620.
25 Id. ¶ 7.1621.
26 Id. ¶ 7.1620.
19
20
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taking into account means “consider along with other factors
before reaching a decision.”27 The Panel agreed that the EC was
legally required to “take account of the interests of developing
country Members in applying its approval legislation, [but they
may also] at the same time take account of other legitimate
interests, including those of its own consumers, its environment,
etc.”28 The Panel even went one step further and observed that
it is conceivable that the EC actually ““took account of”
Argentina’s needs when adopting and applying its general de
facto moratorium on approvals, but ultimately determined that
applications concerning products of export interest to Argentina
warranted no special and differential treatment.”29 Here too, as
was mentioned above, the Panel’s restrained approach in giving
any real force to the SDT is not necessarily problematic because
it is in line with the text of the Agreement.
Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that “[i]t
is recognized that special regard must be given by developed
country Members to the special situation of developing country
Members when considering the application of antidumping
measures under this Agreement.”30 In US – Steel Plate, the
Panel was of the view that no legal requirements for specific
action follow from this provision.31 Hence, it concluded that
WTO members “cannot be expected to comply with an obligation
whose parameters are entirely undefined.”32 In this case, India
accepted “that the nature of the “special regard” will vary from
case to case, but must at least involve some extra consideration
of the arguments of respondents in developing countries.”33
India argued that the U.S. authorities should have considered
the second sentence of Article 15 which states that
“[p]ossibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this

EC Biotech Products, supra note 22.
Id. ¶ 7.1621.
29 Id.
30 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 15, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201.
31 Panel Report,
United States-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Measures on Steel Plate from India, ¶ 7.116, WTO Doc. WT/DS206/R
(adopted July 29, 2002) [hereinafter U.S. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Measures].
32 Id. ¶ 7.110.
33 Id. ¶ 7.104.
27
28
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Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-dumping
duties where they would affect the essential interests of
developing country Members.”34 It claimed the provision
required the U.S. authorities to apply a duty lesser than the
margin of dumping, although such a possibility did not exist
under the relevant U.S. statute. 35 The Panel was sympathetic
to the view that such a lesser duty was desirable. Nevertheless,
it went on to hold that “consideration and application of a lesser
duty is deemed desirable [. . .] but is not mandatory.”36
Therefore, a Member does not need to have the possibility of a
lesser duty in its own legislation.37 In this case, despite the
seemingly mandatory nature of the wording in the treaty
provision, the SDT does not appear to offer anything in practice.
And again, it is extremely difficult to question the Panel’s
reading of the relevant treaty provision. If anything, the Panel
has remained faithful to the text of the treaty.
III. WHAT TO BE DONE?
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, many SDT
provisions are aspirational and even when they are couched in
seemingly obligatory terms, they offer very little. So, the next
question would be what is there to do about it? One avenue
would be to re-evaluate the self-declaring mechanism and how
it serves more harm than good.
IV. THE ELIGIBILITY LIST OF SDT BENEFICIARIES &
SELF-DECLARING DEVELOPING COUNTRY
STATUS
Only the LDC status in the WTO is governed by set rules,
i.e. all members classified as such by the United Nations are
treated so within the WTO.38 However, for the rest of the WTO
members, it is a matter of self-declaration, although that selfdeclaration may or may not be accepted by other members in
34

7.109.

U.S. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures, supra note 31, ¶

Id. ¶ 7.116.
Id.
37 Id.
38 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art.
XI, ¶ 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
35
36
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certain cases.39 For example, one may contend that for a scheme
such as the Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”), the selfdeclaration is of no use for the intended beneficiary, as the
conferring state determines who would benefit from its
scheme.40 However, GSP is just one limb of the SDT provisions.
In various WTO agreements, there are many other SDT
provisions that may be crippled by the self-declaring status of
the developing members. It is also pertinent to remember that
when the GATT was founded, only eleven members were
developing countries,41 whereas now, a majority of the WTO
members are included in this category.42 Thus, it is uncertain
whether the SDT provisions can or should apply to all of them,
who now outnumber the developed member states in the WTO.
Indeed, if the disparate economic developmental stage and lack
of capacity to perform on an equal footing are the raison d’etre
of the SDT provisions, it would appear grossly inequitable to
think that a majority of the WTO membership are to be treated
alike as beneficiaries of the SDT. Of course, some SDT
provisions may somehow distinguish between the members
eligible for such treatment, but they are few and far between.
One way to bring about a change to the status quo would be
to put an end to the current practice of WTO members selfdeclaring themselves as developing members. A proposal along
this line has already been produced by the U.S. at the WTO
negotiations.43 At its core, the U.S. claims that since the advent
39 Anabel González, Bridging the Divide between Developed and
Developing Countries in WTO Negotiations, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON.
(Mar. 12, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investmentpolicy-watch/bridging-divide-between-developed-and-developing-countries.
40 See VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33663, GENERALIZED
SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE 13–14 (2008)
(discussing how a President can choose to remove a developing country because
they no longer require GSP benefits).
41 Hunter Nottage, Trade and Competition in the WTO: Pondering the
Applicability of Special and Differential Treatment, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 23, 25
(2003).
42 Who
are the developing countries in the WTO?, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Nov.
12, 2021).
43 WTO General Council, Procedures to Strengthen the Negotiating
Function of the WTO, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/764/Rev.1, at 1-2 (Nov. 25, 2019)
[hereinafter WTO - Procedures to Strengthen]; see also Madeleine Waddoups,
Quantifying “Developing Nation” for International Trade, 18 NEW
PERSPECTIVES IN FOREIGN POL’Y 65, 66 (2019) (discussing the elements of the
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of the WTO, the world has witnessed a great reduction in
poverty, but the SDT provisions of the WTO, particularly the
criteria for being eligible for the SDT provisions, belies the
contemporary reality that WTO members states cannot be
classified simply as developed and developing.44 The U.S. argues
that members falling under any of the following criteria would
be ineligible for SDT provisions: (i) if it is a member of the OECD
or commenced the process of acceding to the OECD, (ii) if it is a
member of the Group of twenty (G20), (iii) if it has been classified
by the World Bank as a high income country for three
consecutive years, and (iv) if it has a share of more than 0.5 per
cent of global merchandise trade for three consecutive years.45
It is clear that a state with an OECD membership, wellknown as a group of developed countries, or a state that has
persistently been classified as high-income should not be eligible
for SDT. But, the threshold of having a 0.5% share in global
trade or being a member of the G20 to be used for complete
exclusion from the flexibility of SDT provisions seems too rigid.46
More fundamentally, simply having a 0.5% share in global
imports may not be an appropriate indicator of economic
development.47 It may rather mean that the respective WTO
member is too dependent on imported products. And simply due
to their population size, some WTO members may fall into this
category with no nexus to their economic development.48 This is
where there appears to be a need for more stratified SDT
provisions within the WTO rather than an all-inclusive set of
SDT provisions, as is often the case in the WTO regime. To make
SDT provisions more practical and politically amenable to the
U.S. proposal and its implications).
44 See WTO General Council, An Undifferentiated WTO: Self-declared
Development Status Risks Institutional Irrelevance Communication from the
United States, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1, ¶ 1.2–1.7 (Feb. 14, 2019)
[hereinafter An Undifferentiated WTO].
45 WTO - Procedures to Strengthen, supra note 43, at 2.
46 See Waddoups, supra note 43, at 68 (explaining that the United States
should expand its flexibility when considering developing nations as a signal
of goodwill towards the WTO).
47 See id. at 67 (discussing that Indonesia, despite having a share of global
imports above 0.5%, could not sustain itself because of its category of imports).
48 OECD-WTO Database on Trade in Value-Added FAQs: Background
Note, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/TIVA_FAQ_Final.pdf, (last visited
Nov. 12, 2021) (explaining how it is possible to “overstate” imports and
exports).

11
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developed economies, and to make them more meaningful for
smaller economies, there could be a two-pronged approach: some
SDT provisions may apply to LDCs and small developing
members of the WTO, while others may apply to larger
developing countries such as those that are members of G20 (but
not G7). This is a proposal on which both developed economies
and developing members seem to somewhat converge.49
The essence of the U.S. proposal, though not necessarily the
indicators of reform, also resonates in the position of the EU in
the following words:
[The] lack of nuance and its consequences with regard to the
special and differential treatment question has been a major
source of tensions in the WTO and an obstacle to the progress of
negotiations: the demand for blanket flexibilities for two thirds of
the WTO membership dilutes the call from those countries that
have evident needs for development assistance, leads to much
weaker ambition in negotiations and is used as a tool to block
progress in, or even at the beginning of, negotiations.50

A counter-argument raised by some developing members is
that despite the economic progress by many developing
countries, there is still a major development disparity between
the economically developed and developing members. 51 They
claim that since the inception of the WTO until now, the gap in
the GDP between developed and developing members has
widened.52 They also point out that their joining or acceding to
49 See An Undifferentiated WTO, supra note 44, ¶ 4.5 (explaining how selfdeclaration reduces WTO negotiating power and creates an uneven playing
field between global powerhouses, and smaller, poorer nations); see also WTO
General Council, Strengthening the WTO to Promote Development and
Inclusivity, WTO Doc WT/GC/W/778/Rev.3, at ¶ 3.3 (Dec. 4, 2020) [hereinafter
Strengthening the WTO] (acknowledging how both undeveloped and developed
countries agree that SDT provisions give certain member nations unfair
advantages over one another).
50 European Commission Concept Paper, WTO modernisation, ¶ 31 (Sept.
18, 2018).
51 WTO General Council, The Continued Relevance of Special and
Differential Treatment in Favour of Developing Members to Promote
Development and Ensure Inclusiveness, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2, ¶ 1.1
(Mar. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Special and Differential Treatment in Favour of
Developing Members]; see generally EC Biotech Products supra note 22, ¶ 4.493
(emphasizing that despite economic development, European communities have
ignored the special needs of developing countries in areas of trade and financial
expansion).
52 Special and Differential Treatment in Favour of Developing Members,

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss1/1
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the WTO was on the basis of a negotiated treaty right that gives
them the option to self-declare as a developing member.53 Both
of the claims are likely to hold factually. But at the same time,
treating large developing WTO members with a very high per
capita income, such as Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, or
Israel, and those of vulnerable economies in Sub-Saharan Africa
or in Asia alike seems irrational.54 And for both of these sets of
WTO members to be eligible for SDT flexibilities under the same
WTO rules seems to be untenable and a travesty of equity.
Another pertinent question could be whether this practice
of self-declaring as a developing member is a customary practice
or not. Looking at the GATT panel and working party reports,
scholarly commentary persuasively opines that in some cases,
the GATT panels have tested the invocation of developing
country status by contracting parties implying that it was not
entirely self-declaratory.55 Thus, it argues that the practice of
self-declaration may not suffice in itself as a customary practice
under Article XVI:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the
WTO.56 However, academically, and also from the point of the
dynamics of future WTO negotiations, it is a critical question.
But from a policy point of view, there is a more pressing
question: are the SDTs in their current form desirable? If the
continuation of the existing practice is inimical for the SDT
provisions to be sufficiently effective, then customary practice
notwithstanding, it needs to evolve.
It may be pertinent to note here that Article XXXVI:8 of the
GATT provides that “[t]he developed contracting parties do not
expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the
trade of less-developed contracting parties.”57 A crucial phrase
here is “less-developed contracting parties.”58 It seems plausible
supra note 51, ¶ 2.1-2.2.
53 Id. ¶ 5.10.
54 Id. ¶ 6.2.
55 Sparsha Janardhan, World Trade and ‘Customs’: Is Self-Declaration of
Development Status a ‘Customary Practice’ at the WTO?, Paper Presentation
at the 7th SIEL Conference (July 9, 2021) (on file with the author).
56 Id. at 20.
57 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 36, ¶ 8, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade].
58 Id.
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to think that the drafters of the Article did not think that lessdeveloped contracting parties are necessarily synonymous with
developing contracting parties. Thus, arguably, at the inception
of the development, as a priority in the GATT regime, no
recognition seems to exist that SDT provisions would extend to
all developing country members. However, a difficulty with this
conclusion is that the term “developing contracting party” did
not find a place in the GATT 1947, and the “less-developed
contracting parties” in Article XXVIII or Part IV of the GATT
1947 simply referred to economically backward states.59
However, even that expression would not appear to apply to
many of the large developing members of the WTO.60
Even if the overall gap in GDP between developed and
developing members may have widened, it does not necessarily
follow that this is evenly applicable to all developing members,
including a very diverse group of WTO members today. The
same lack of specificity applies to the claim of developing
members that most of the world’s poor, around 61.8%, live in
non-LDCs.61 While the number may be real, it does not show
what percentage of them live in large developing countries. This
fact does not explain the percentage of the developing states’
population in this category or the percentage of poor people in
LDCs. More importantly, it does not indicate how many of these
people live in the OECD members or high-income members.
Again, there is already a practice of using per capita income as
a criterion for the use of export subsidies in the WTO Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.62 Where exactly to

59 See
Facts
about
World
Economy,
SWAPDIAL,
https://www.swapdial.com/public/knowledge-contents/industrial-data/factsabout-world-economy/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2021) (defining “economically
backward states” as “Developing nations” and distinguishing them from
“Developed Nations” because of their comparatively lower income,
manufacturing, and HID numbers).
60 See generally Lynge Nielsen, Classifications of Countries Based on
Their Level of Development: How it is Done and How it Could be Done 41 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper 11/31, Feb. 2011) (explaining the lack of
rational and in turn inaccuracies in the current system determining whether
a country is developed or developing).
61 Strengthening the WTO, supra note 49, ¶ 3.2; Special and Differential
Treatment in Favour of Developing Members, supra note 51, ¶ 2.5.
62 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 27,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex IA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 (listing the developing countries referred to
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draw the line is a complex matter beyond the scope of this
article. But it would appear that because the self-declaring of
developing member status is a negotiated right in itself, it
cannot be a justification for its perpetual existence.
However, any sectoral classification of LDCs, small
developing countries, any product-by-product approach based on
their respective share in the global market, or any closely
analogous criterion as suggested in the literature63 would
probably be unworkable for most LDCs as they tend to have a
limited export basket.64 For example, in the case of Bangladesh,
a very high percentage of its export earnings is concentrated on
garments and textile products.65 Similarly, if it becomes
ineligible to be treated as an LDC for the garments and textile
products, it would lose the benefits of SDT to a substantial
degree.66 The simple categorizations as developing and LDC
should not matter either. The difference between the two types
of members in some cases may be inconsequential.67 So, they
should be treated alike. In the WTO, through the decision on
net food-importing developing countries, there seems to be a
recognition of this as Article 16 of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture calls on the developed members to take “Measures
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform
Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing
Developing Countries”68 as opposed to only LDCs or all
developing members.

in Paragraph 2(a) of Article 27).
63 James Bacchus & Inu Manak, The Development Dimension: What to Do
about Differential Treatment in Trade, 887 CATO INST. 1, 17 (Apr. 13, 2020),
https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/development-dimension-what-do-aboutdifferential-treatment-trade.
64 Society of International Economic Law, SIEL Conversations April 2021:
Special and Differential Treatment under the WTO, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2001),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQB25mUAfk4.
65 Sanjay Kathuria, Bangladesh Is Clothes-Minded, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct.
7, 2021, 9:33 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/07/bangladesh-garmentindustry-economy-development-exports-trade-growth/.
66 Peter Kleen & Sheila Page, Special and Differential Treatment of
Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization, OVERSEAS DEV. INST.,
at x (2005), https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/3320.pdf.
67 Id.
68 Agreement on Agriculture, art. 16, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410
[hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture].
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Detractors may argue that many of these criteria do not
have any direct correlation with trade. However, development
is a vexed and relative term and associating the eligibility for
SDT to some of the objectively verifiable criteria along the lines
mooted in the U.S. proposal at the WTO seems to be rational. It
would be difficult to argue that OECD member states or even
large developing members such as Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa are not differently situated from LDCs and
small developing members. Just as there is a reason for
differentiating between the developed and developing
economies, there is a cogent case for differentiating between the
very high number of WTO membership: the developing
countries. Thus, the developing countries that are quite
disparate in terms of their economic development should be
differentiated. There should be LDCs and possibly some small
developing members who should be differentiated from large
developing members or economically rich members selfdeclaring as developing members.
As eloquently observed by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools
in Albania that from a formal point of view, there should be no
discrimination of any kind but “equality in fact may involve the
necessity of different treatment in order to attain a result which
establishes an equilibrium between different situations.”69
Thus, SDT provisions are not an end in itself; rather they are a
means to an end of achieving benefits to their recipients so that
they can participate in international trade more fully. Unless
the SDT provisions can attain any tangible benefits for their
intended beneficiaries, then the efficacy of having them in place
is questionable. The SDT provisions are never mentioned within
the preamble of the WTO Agreements, rather in the main text,
which would further reinforce that despite the aspirational
wordings, they have only been designed as an ornamental tool
for interpretation of the basic treaty provisions.70
Textually too, there seems to be some implicit recognition
of the disparity among the beneficiaries of SDT and the
concomitant need for differential treatment. The preamble to

69 Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 64, at 19 (Apr. 6) (emphasis added).
70 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 68, art. 15.
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the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO states the
“need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing
countries, and especially the least developed among them,
secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”71
Thus, it is clear that despite recognizing the special need for both
developing and least developed members, the need is more acute
for LDCs. Article IV:7 of the Marrakesh Agreement also
stipulates that “the Committee on Trade and Development shall
periodically review the special provisions in the Multilateral
Trade Agreements in favour of the least-developed country
Members and report to the General Council for appropriate
action.”72 The Agreement does not contain any such concrete
requirement of periodic review for provisions applicable to the
developing countries. Thus, it would seem that the drafters of
the WTO Agreement have not viewed the LDCs and developing
members alike.
However, despite its overall merit, there are problems with
the U.S. proposal on the SDT reform. A particularly problematic
aspect of the U.S.’s proposal is that if it is followed, it may
eventually wipe out SDT for not just large or economically strong
developing members, but for all members of the WTO. The
proposal reads that “[n]othing in this Decision precludes
reaching agreement that in sector-specific negotiations other
Members are also ineligible for special and differential
treatment.”73 While it is not explicitly stated, this means that
even a small developing country or LDC can, in future
negotiations, be excluded from the benefits of the SDT
flexibilities. Unless this concern is effectively addressed, likely
all existing beneficiaries will strongly oppose the U.S. proposal.
Some may point to the tradition of conducting trade policy
reviews at the individual WTO member level, which has been
well-entrenched in the WTO practice, and argue that this same
analysis should determine the SDT eligibility of a member.74
But it is unclear how that would play out. Firstly, the WTO
Secretariat conducts the trade policy review, which is more of a
71 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
72 Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
73 WTO - Procedures to Strengthen, supra note 43, at 2.
74 Kleen & Page, supra note 66, at 80.
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stocktaking exercise of reviewing the trade-related laws,
policies, and practices of a WTO member state.75 Conducting a
similar process would appear to be administratively challenging.
Secondly, it would also mean that most of the smaller WTO
members would feel more pressure from their counterparts.76
The fact of GSP being used as a means for pressurizing the
intended beneficiaries to the demands of the benefit-giving,
developed state is well-known.77
Another challenge with the potential implementation of the
approach discussed in this article would be that even many
LDCs and developing members may not be too enthusiastic
about a radical change in SDT eligibility. It is more or less
common knowledge that the economically less developed
members in the WTO prefer collective negotiations over
individual ones.78 Being endowed with little individual economic
clout, it is natural for them to try to pull their weight
collectively.79 Thus, they will likely oppose this type of reform of
SDT provisions. However, the presence of multiple formal and
informal groups involving LDCs and developing members and
the divergence of interests on various matters brings into
question the extent to which there is a strong alliance on various
areas. More importantly, even the change in the list of
beneficiaries would still mean that the eligible beneficiaries of
the SDT provisions are not left to bargain alone; instead, they
would still be able to bargain collectively. Furthermore, it is not
improbable that when there would be a significant review and
overhaul of the unenforceable SDT provisions that many
members may be more enthusiastic in embracing the changes.
V. HOW MORE CONCRETE SDT PROVISIONS WOULD

75 Trade
Policy
Reviews:
ensuring
transparency,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm
(last
visited Nov. 13, 2021).
76 VanGrasstek, supra note 8, at 94.
77 See MD. RIZWANUL ISLAM, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN SOUTH ASIA:
CHARTING A LEGAL ROADMAP, 116–17 (2012) (explaining how prevalent it is for
a beneficiary to bend to the requirements of a developed state); see also Joost
Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are RulesToward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 338 (2000)
(describing the use of countermeasures to induce compliance).
78 Id. at 112.
79 Id.
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HELP
The value of more specific SDT provisions is evident when
we contrast the above cases from a case under Article of 9.1 the
WTO Agreement on Safeguards.80 This Article states that
[s]afeguard measures shall not be applied against a product
originating in a developing country Member as long as its share of
imports of the product concerned in the importing Member does
not exceed 3 per cent, provided that developing country Members
with less than 3 per cent import share collectively account for not
more than 9 per cent of total imports of the product concerned.81

The WTO Panel in Dominican Republic – Safeguard
Measures held that a WTO member opting to apply for any
safeguard measures is “obliged to adopt all reasonable measures
available to them to exclude all developing countries that meet
the requirements in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards.”82 The Panel accepted that the adopting state party
might enjoy some flexibility in applying this provision, but
“[i]rrespective of the way in which each Member complies with
this provision, however, the Member concerned must show that
it has made the efforts it can to exclude all those Members
covered by the provision in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards.”83 Thus, armed with SDT provisions that go beyond
imprecise words, there is a distinct prospect that the provision
would bring about tangible outcomes for the intended
beneficiaries.
Regard may also be given to Articles 27.10 and 27.11 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.84 Article
27.10 provides that a countervailing duty investigation of a
product originating in a developing country shall be terminated

80 Agreement on Safeguards, art. 9.1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125
[hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards].
81 Id.
82 Panel Report, Dominican Republic - Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric, ¶ 7.393, WTO Docs WT/DS415/R,
WT/DS416/R, WT/DS417/R, WT/DS418/R (adopted Jan. 31, 2021).
83 Id. ¶ 7.396.
84 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 27.10–
27.11, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures].
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as soon as the investigating authorities determine that: (a) the
overall level of subsidies granted does not exceed two per cent,
or three per cent in some cases, of its value calculated on a per
unit basis; or (b) the volume of the subsidized imports represents
less than four percent of the total imports of the like product
unless imports from developing country members collectively
account for more than nine percent of the total imports of the
like product in the importing member.85 One could naturally
expect that these specific provisions would be literally and
strictly interpreted by the WTO Panels and Appellate Body (AB).
And the practice conforms to that expectation. The AB
interpreted these provisions in US – Carbon Steel, in the
following words:
Articles 27.10 and 27.11 of the SCM Agreement require
termination of a countervailing duty investigation with respect to
a developing country Member whenever “the overall level of
subsidies granted does not exceed” 2 or 3 percent, depending on
the circumstances. These provisions require authorities, in a
countervailing duty investigation, to apply a higher de minimis
subsidization threshold to imports from developing country
Members.86

VI. RENEGOTIATING THE ASPIRATIONAL OR
ORNAMENTAL SDT PROVISIONS
Based on the foregoing, merely changing the eligible
beneficiaries of the SDT from all developing members to only the
LDCs and some smaller developing members would not suffice
to meet the needs of the smaller economies. It would have to be
in conjunction with reforming the imprecise and aspirational
words contained in most of the SDT. This has been recognized
by some developing members of the WTO in that they urged in
September 2001 that “all the existing S&D provisions in various
WTO agreements should be fully operationalized/implemented.
The implementation should go beyond technicalities and include
operationalization of provisions that presently lack operational

85 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 84,
art. 27.10–27.11.
86 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, ¶ 82,
WTO Doc. WT/DS213/AB/R (adopted Nov. 28, 2002).
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modalities.”87
In one way, the proposal reflects an
understanding that these members recognize that the SDT
provisions have not worked, and it is ambitious that it seeks to
implement all SDT provisions. However, it is doubtful, without
any thorough re-examination and amendment of the SDT
provisions, any meaningful outcome is at all possible. Thus,
there may be a commission of experts unaffiliated with the
governments of WTO members who may review the SDT
provisions in various WTO agreements.88 Based on the findings
of the proposed commission, the text of SDT provisions can be
negotiated for implementation by members.89
The benefit of a dedicated commission can be two-fold. One,
that it may work independently. And also, because at the Bali
Ministerial Conference, the WTO members had set up a
monitoring mechanism to act as a focal point within the WTO
for analyzing and reviewing the implementation of SDT
provisions.90 However, until now, no written submissions from
WTO members have been made in this regard. The exact reason
for this inertia is a matter of guesswork. In one sense, it may
imply a lack of interest, but given that the developing and LDC
members have expressed the view that SDT provisions have not
done enough for them, this is quite a remarkable inertia.
One possible explanation could be that the leading
developing WTO members who have the resources to influence
negotiation have not been convinced that the SDT reform would
really benefit them and so, somehow sought to maintain the
status quo. The LDCs and smaller developing members may be
dissatisfied with the breadth and scope of the existing SDT
provisions, but they may lack the resources to put meaningful
reform proposals to the WTO. The focus of the developed
countries, as would be epitomized from the position of the U.S.
and E.U., seem to concentrate on limiting the list of countries
who would be eligible to benefit from the SDT provisions, rather
87 Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential
Treatment, ¶ 12, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/442 (Sept. 19, 2001).
88 See Bacchus & Manak, supra note 63, at 17, 20 (arguing that the
current SDT provisions on the term “developing country” are ambiguous,
requiring a new approach that properly classifies nations and provides
pathways to economic development).
89 See id. at 17–18.
90 Monitoring Mechanism on Special and Differential Treatment, ¶ 3–4,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(13)/45, WT/L/920 (Dec. 11, 2013).
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than any systemic reform of SDTs geared at conferring more
tangible gains for the beneficiaries.91 Thus, solely a membercentric reform may not be easily forthcoming. In any case, when
the reform mechanism driven by members has not succeeded in
bringing about any change, a systematic review by a dedicated
body could be useful in that at least it could provide a detailed
outline for the WTO members to consider. However, it still begs
the question where the impetus to conduct such a review would
come from. Possibly, NGOs and scholarly writings may play a
role on this front. But of course, the influence of these actors
would be limited in comparison to that of the members, but it
may bring about some momentum.
VII. CONCLUSION
SDT provisions should not be treated any differently from
the rest of the GATT/WTO acquis. But at the same time,
preserving the concept of SDT as immutable is open to serious
questions. Whether the SDT provisions can be more effective is
not necessarily a question of redistributive justice, but it is about
making the negotiated provisions of the GATT/WTO to achieve
their expected outcome. And the benefits of the global trade
rules to reach all members of the WTO. The WTO cannot forever
remain laggard in taking the SDT beyond the realm of
aspirations appearing to offer something to their beneficiaries,
but in practice meaning nothing. Even beyond the question of
the plight of the intended beneficiaries of the SDT, this is a
question of the broader legitimacy of the WTO.
The WTO law simply cannot be half-awake to the organic
inequality of its members (i.e., providing for SDT provisions for
helping economically backward members), but at the same time
be half asleep when it comes to how the laws operate in practice.
It is not the claim of this article that all pressing challenges of
the SDT would be untangled by following the steps discussed
here, or that even following the points raised here would be
easily attainable. However, there should be some beginning of
the end of the status quo with SDT in the WTO. A step in the
right direction would be to set up a commission for undertaking
a thorough review of the SDT provisions and an overhaul of the

91

Bacchus & Manak, supra note 63, at 13.
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current long list of beneficiaries of the SDT provisions.
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